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3Introduction
During 2017 the UK Housing Review is celebrating 25 years of publication. The first edition(then called the Housing Finance Review) first appeared in 1993. This mid-year Briefing is
the eighth in a series, complementing the main Review now published annually in the early
Spring. This edition of the Briefing has been held back to allow it to reflect developments
since June’s general election.
Last year’s Briefing went to press just before the referendum on Britain’s membership of the
EU, whose outcome is now seen to have major – if still unclear – implications for the
economy, for migration and for the housing market. In the month in which the 2017 Review
was published (March), there was a new Budget and also devolved government elections in
Scotland, Wales and Northern Ireland. The last resulted in frustration, however, as the
Northern Ireland Assembly was suspended for the fourth time since the 1998 Peace
Agreement. 
Then, in June, an unexpected general election result was followed only a week later by the
horrendous fire that consumed the Grenfell Tower in Kensington & Chelsea. Both events carry
implications for housing policy that are discussed in this Briefing, albeit that their full impacts
will take time to emerge.
Drawing on the latest statistics, the Briefing assesses the implications of new policy and
market developments in thirteen key topic areas, together with dedicated pages on Scotland,
Wales and Northern Ireland. Our final page provides a list of updated tables now available on
the Review’s website (www.ukhousingreview.org.uk).
Housing demand and supply
New housing supply continues to fall behind new household growth across Great Britain.
Projecting future housing need is fraught with difficulty, even more so now that the Brexit
vote seems to be having an early impact on migration levels. All of the UK administrations
have housing supply targets after elections this year, but none will be easily achieved. In
England, annual supply remains some 30,000 short of the ‘break even’ point with household
growth. The Briefing argues that while supply is of critical importance, so is the rather more
neglected issue of affordability, in both the private and the social housing sectors.
Homeownership, affordability and mortgage access
The Westminster government has shifted slightly away from promoting homeownership as its
main housing priority, but our reassessment of total housing investment up to 2020/21 still
shows support for the private market totalling some £32 billion, as against affordable
housing investment of £8 billion.
The Briefing looks at the other policy shifts towards homeownership and away from renting,
but does not conclude that they yet show signs of any decisive alteration in tenure trends.
While government assistance schemes for homeownership undoubtedly help, the barriers 
to entering the market – though different from a decade ago – are still considerable. 
Affordable rented housing
Scotland, Wales and Northern Ireland continue to put considerable emphasis in policies and
in their budgets on the delivery of affordable housing, with Scotland in particular investing
and delivering proportionately many more homes than England. The Scottish and Welsh
elections reinforced affordable housing targets; affordable housing provision in Northern
Ireland though has been set back by the political crisis and budget changes.
In England, the government has given a modest boost to affordable housing investment.
While output has increased, it is still a long way short of what is required to meet needs.
Homelessness
Following the early successes of a new and wider homelessness prevention policy in Wales,
parallel provisions have now been legislated for in England and should start to take effect
from 2018 onwards. While these changes are positive, many concerns remain about
homelessness pressures, especially in London, and these are reinforced by analysis suggesting
there will be substantial increases in ‘core’ homelessness in years to come.
Welfare reform
One of the more immediate concerns about welfare reform policies is about the way the new
lower ‘benefit cap’ has more than trebled (to nearly 70,000) the numbers affected. These
households’ benefits are capped below the level of their scale-rate entitlements, with all the
hardship that entails. Looking ahead there are also concerns about the impact of the local
housing allowance caps due to apply to social sector tenants, and in particular the effects on
younger, single people only entitled to the much lower ‘shared accommodation rate’.
■
In March next year the UK Housing Review 2018 will aim to provide a considered appraisal of
the Westminster government’s housing and welfare policy changes, including any resulting
from the Autumn Budget, as well as assessments of the latest policy developments in
Scotland, Wales and Northern Ireland.
Meanwhile, this edition of the Briefing has been compiled with the assistance of Suzanne
Fitzpatrick and Beth Watts (on homelessness), Tamsin Stirling (on Wales), Justin Cartwright
(on Northern Ireland) and Paul Cosgrove (on the revised tables listed on page 20).
Steve Wilcox, John Perry, Mark Stephens and Peter Williams 
September 2017
4The pattern of the UK’s economic performance in the aftermath of the global financialcrisis (GFC) is now well-established: employment growth has yet to restore earnings to
pre-downturn levels.
Since the outcome of the EU referendum in June 2016, the pound has fallen, putting
upward pressure on inflation, and the future is shrouded in uncertainty. As the Office for
Budgetary Responsibility commented in March, ‘... there is no meaningful basis for
predicting the precise end-point of the [Brexit] negotiations as a basis for our forecast.’1
Mark Carney, governor of the Bank of England, has said that uncertainty ‘...weighs on the
decisions of businesses and households and holds down both demand and supply.’2
The OECD also attributed the slowing of the UK economy to ‘uncertainty about the Brexit
negotiations.’3 It charts the decline in real economic growth from 3.1 per cent in 2014 to an
anticipated one per cent in 2018 – so the UK moves from outstripping the USA, OECD and
euro area to lagging behind them all. The Bank of England’s central forecast for the three
years up to 2020 never has the growth rate reaching two per cent in any quarter until then. 
Meanwhile monetary policy has continued to take the strain. The effect of sterling’s
devaluation has been to increase inflation, which the Bank of England expects to peak at
three per cent in October 2017 before returning to target. The Monetary Policy Committee
has so far not raised interest rates in response. In August its members voted 6-2 to
maintain the bank rate at the historic low of 0.25 per cent. However, with economic
forecasts generally anticipating slowing growth rates, the MPC noted unanimously that any
future rate rises would ‘be at a gradual pace and to a limited extent.’5
UK economic management since 2010 has therefore relied on monetary policy – both
through interest rates and quantitative easing (QE) – to maintain demand in the economy.
The MPC introduced the Term Funding Scheme from September 2016 to encourage banks
to pass on money at low interest rates to customers, and this continues to February 2018
when it then tapers down. QE in general is designed to support asset prices, and thus
inhibited the early ambitions of the coalition government to reorient the economy away
from relying on rising property prices – and in particular on house price inflation. 
The UK economy is also weakened by the so-called ‘productivity puzzle.’ This describes the
slow-down in the rate of productivity growth following the GFC. Whilst this has happened
across the advanced economies, it is especially acute in the UK. By 2015, the UK’s
productivity was 15.2 per cent below pre-downturn trend, the largest gap in the G7 and
twice the average.6 Additionally, the ‘wage share’ has been falling in advanced economies,
so labour market incomes have lagged behind the diminished rate of productivity growth.
The ILO and other organisations report that this has been most acute in the USA,
Germany and Japan, but has also occurred in the UK.7 According to provisional figures
released by ONS, in May real average earnings in the UK were 7.4 percentage points lower
than the February 2008 peak.8
Whilst Brexit casts an extra shadow of uncertainty over the UK’s economic prospects,
longer-standing structural problems in the labour market continue to depress disposable
incomes and economic growth. 
References
1 Office for Budget Responsibility (2017) Economic and fiscal outlook, March, Cm 9419. London: OBR.
2 Quoted in Financial Times, ‘Carney warns Brexit uncertainty is weighing on UK economy’, 3 August 2017.
3 OECD (2017) United Kingdom – Economic forecast summary. Paris: OECD.
4 OBR (2017), op.cit., Table 1.2.
5 Bank of England (2017) Monetary Policy Summary, August. London: BoE.
6 ONS (2017) International comparisons of UK productivity (ICP), final estimates: 2015. London: ONS.
7 ILO, IMF, OECD, World Bank (2015) Income inequality and labour income share in G20 countries: Trends,
Impacts, Causes. Paper prepared for G20 employment and finance ministers. Geneva: ILO.
8 ONS, op.cit.
Uncertain economic prospects
Whilst the government’s deficit (Public Sector Net Borrowing) is expected to fall below
three per cent of GDP in 2017/18, total debt (Public Sector Net Debt) will continue to rise
to 88.8 per cent of GDP.4 Nevertheless, the government has given some indication of being
prepared to soften its ‘austerity’ policy of fiscal consolidation. This could take the form of
either extending the target date for deficit reduction or reducing expenditure cuts via
higher taxes. The policy of freezing working-age benefits at cash value for 2016-20 is likely
to come under scrutiny as inflation rises, as it squeezes the real incomes of low-income
households, although loosening the public sector pay cap might be a policy change more
attractive to the government's supporters. The DUP may also exercise influence over the
direction of policy. Any policy changes are likely to be announced in November – the
month to which the Budget has now been moved. 
The UK’s declining growth rate
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5August 2017 marked the tenth anniversary of the credit crunch, when uncertainty aboutthe veracity of US mortgage-backed securities caused the wholesale market to seize up
overnight. The credit crunch morphed into the Global Financial Crisis with the failure of
Lehman Brothers in October 2008. As governments borrowed to rescue banks and stave off
catastrophe, a sovereign debt crisis arose in some countries as markets became reluctant to
lend to heavily indebted governments. The negotiations over the formation of the 2010-15
coalition government took place against the backdrop of the Greek sovereign debt crisis,
which appears to have persuaded the Liberal Democrats to join the Conservatives in
prioritising deficit reduction, arguing that the UK faced a similar fate unless it brought its
public finances under control.
And so the policy of ‘austerity’ was born. An emergency budget in June 2010 made tax and
spending decisions intended to restore the government’s financial health. Under the self-
imposed ‘fiscal mandate’ the cyclical deficit was meant to disappear in 2015/16, and public
sector net debt was forecast to peak at 70.3 per cent in 2013/14 and fall thereafter.1 Whilst
Departmental Expenditure Limits would increase in line with inflation, there would be £83
billion of cuts to Annually Managed Expenditure – which of course includes social security.
Things did not work out quite as planned, as economic growth fell below expectations and
fiscal targets were missed. By the time of the 2011 Autumn Statement, some newspapers
were speculating about the end of austerity. They had little reason to do so. The Autumn
Statement confirmed that ‘...the Government plans a total consolidation of £147 billion per
year by 2016-17, consisting of total reductions in spending of £116 billion and a net
increase in taxes of £31 billion.’2 Back in 2011/12 just over half the consolidation came in
the form of spending cuts and the rest from tax rises, but the contribution from expenditure
cuts was forecast to rise to almost 80 per cent in 2016-17.3 So austerity was continuing and
its impact was shifting towards lower-income households. 
The pattern of missed fiscal targets has been repeated since 2011. The 2016 Autumn
Statement once again confirmed that targets had been missed – this time due to insipid tax
revenues as well as lower economic growth. Now the government intended to ‘return the
public finances to balance as soon as possible in the next Parliament, with an interim
objective of reducing the structural deficit to less than 2% of GDP.’4 Debt as a percentage 
of GDP, originally to have peaked at 70 per cent in 2013/14, was now forecast to peak at 
90 per cent in 2017/18. The 2017 Budget also promised to ‘maintain discipline on public
spending.’5
Following June’s unexpected general election result, there was renewed speculation about
austerity coming to an end. During the campaign, the Conservative Party faced the ignominy
of having to retract key expenditure cuts proposed in its manifesto (means-testing winter fuel
payments and ending the ‘triple lock’ on state pensions). Even then the manifesto foresaw a
balanced budget ‘by the middle of the next decade.’ Following the election the chancellor
fuelled speculation when he said that the public was ‘weary’ of austerity. 
Looking over the post-election landscape, Carl Emmerson6 of the IFS notes that on current
plans the government intends to increase spending by £37 billion in real terms by 2021-22.
However, this would represent a reduction in the share of public spending in the economy
equivalent to £17 billion. Moreover, the £17 billion is a net figure which includes a 
£10 billion increase in investment spending, offset by a further fall in current spending
equivalent to £27 billion. In other words, drastic cuts in services are still to come.
If the government opts to ease austerity, it is likely to be selectively targeted on core services
such as health where spending has to rise simply to keep up with rising demands, and
perhaps on loosening public sector wage restrictions. The planned cuts to social security
benefits through mechanisms such as the four-year freeze in working-age benefits are
illustrated in the chart. Unless the government finds a way to reverse or to mitigate this
policy, for those on low and modest incomes austerity is far from over.
References
1 HM Treasury (2010) Budget 2010, HC61. London: HM Treasury.
2 HM Treasury (2011) Autumn Statement 2011, Cm 8231. London: HM Treasury.
3 Ibid.
4 HM Treasury (2016) Autumn Statement 2016, Cm 9362. London: HM Treasury.
5 HM Treasury (2017) Spring Budget 2017, Cm 1025. London: HM Treasury.
6 Emmerson, C. (2017) Where next for tax and spend? London: IFS (see www.ifs.org.uk/publications/9363). 
Public spending: An end to austerity?
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6For a government already in difficulties following the failure to secure a clear majorityin the June General Election, the Grenfell Tower tragedy a week later compounded
their problems. Grenfell and its aftermath have huge implications for government
spending: not only for the housing budget and the retreat from social housing provision,
but also for the housing white paper and its priorities. Politics was refocussed and though
Grenfell will slowly move out of the headlines the delays in helping residents, the on-
going inquiry and huge public sympathy are likely to mean that it remains a
significant influence on policy and investment decisions. 
The new housing minister Alok Sharma, MP (the 37th since Aneurin
Bevan, see inside front cover) was plunged into the crisis and
targeted by Grenfell protesters for delays in providing permanent
housing. It is clear that not only Kensington & Chelsea but
many other social landlords across the UK expect government
to fund replacement and other work in tower blocks now at
risk. It was already striking that February’s housing white
paper contained no discussion of public investment and
now the issue looms large. Set in the context of Brexit and
continuing (if perhaps slightly reduced) austerity, this
seems certain to cause considerable problems. If the extra
work needed receives no or insufficient government
support, costs will fall on landlords’ rental incomes and
will inevitably displace other investment. If the government
offers support but without adding to the national pot, there
would be a similar effect but at national level. Only a new,
specific grant or subsidy for post-Grenfell works will ensure they
are not done at the expense of other affordable housing investment.
The background is an ambitious government housing programme but
with the priorities largely those set by the previous chancellor, George Osborne.
The pie chart summarises the current investment picture, updating the detailed version in
the UK Housing Review 2017 (page 80). It shows the overwhelming emphasis on support
for the private market, taking 79% of the total. This shifted only slightly in favour of
affordable housing in Philip Hammond’s Autumn Statement, despite its announcement
of extra funding for new build at Affordable Rents. 
So far, carrying forward the proposals in the white paper has been slow: consultations
have taken place and official responses issued, but as yet there have been few concrete
changes. This may be the inevitable result of current pressures, with Brexit making huge
demands on the civil service, the aftermath of Grenfell being an understandable priority
for DCLG, the HCA and local authorities, and the general election both suspending
detailed policy announcements and then resulting in a hung parliament, in which the
previous housing minister lost his seat. 
While Gavin Barwell had begun to earn a reputation for being willing to widen the
housing agenda beyond the private housing market, the new minister has not
surprisingly begun by saying he will take ‘an opportunity over the summer to think
carefully’ about his brief. However, he added that ‘the start has to be building
more houses.’ While this again might be expected, it avoids two glaring
investment priorities which have to be taken on board (along with
other post-Grenfell lessons like addressing failures in
communication between social landlords and tenants). 
The first priority is the need for much greater investment in the
existing housing stock, an issue highlighted by the Grenfell
tragedy. Not only has the Decent Homes Standard not been
updated for a decade, but resources for keeping homes up to
the standard are being eroded and achievement of it is
slipping. Social landlords are also failing to keep up with
the task of raising the energy efficiency of their homes and
reducing fuel poverty among tenants, made more technically
challenging post-Grenfell but still vital in meeting statutory
carbon emissions targets. Essentially, investment in the
existing social stock has been left for landlords to finance from
rents, while government has been cutting their rental income and
will continue to do so for another two years.
The second priority is more investment in genuinely affordable
housing, which appears to continue to take second place to increasing the
overall supply of housing, despite the fact that more than three million UK
households now spend over a third of their income on housing costs. As the summary
on page 9 shows, affordable output via government programmes in England is 
running at half the levels of six years ago, with social rent output only a fraction of 
what it was then.
Overall government housing investment has grown considerably but the chart shows
that it is still seriously unbalanced. This does at least give the government the option – 
if it decides to take it – of making a significant increase in affordable investment by
shifting resources away from private sector support, without necessarily having to
increase overall commitments to housing in the coming Budget.
Post-election housing blues?
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7It has long been the case that net migration is the most volatile and difficult-to-forecastfactor in making household projections. The Brexit vote has now further complicated 
the picture. The long-term outcome of the Brexit negotiations and the future regulatory
arrangements on migration to and from other EU countries (the EU27) are still 
unknown, but the vote and the resulting uncertainty are already having an impact on
migration flows.
In the last half of 2016 there was a very sharp drop in international net migration to the
UK. In the year ending March 2017, migration was down by a quarter (to 246,000)
compared to the year ending in March 2016 (when the rolling annual figures were virtually
unchanged over the previous year). This implies that net migration fell about one-third
between the quarter that ended with the Brexit vote and the quarter ending March 2017.
Not all of this can be directly related to Brexit uncertainties. Only two-thirds of the net fall
in migration in the year ending March 2017 (compared to the previous year) relates to
flows to/from the EU27. And only about half of the fall in net migration was work-related;
over a quarter was study-related. Nonetheless concerns about the potential impact of Brexit,
both on UK economic prospects and on the likely tightening of immigration rules, have
clearly played a part. And now they have been reinforced by slow economic growth in the
first half of 2017, and a sharp fall in the value of the pound against the euro, further
affecting the attractiveness of the UK as a work destination.
The sharp fall in net EU migration is remarkable given that nothing has yet been settled,
and when the indications are that any major change in the UK immigration regime may 
not take place for several years. However this sharp fall is actually broadly in line with the
assumptions made in the 2014-based household projections. Further ahead there are
inevitable questions about how much further it might decline, especially given that there are
already many sectors of the economy facing recruitment problems due to lower migration.
This uncertainty is a major headache for the production of the next round of population
and household projections. Both the severe economic and housing market dislocations of
the last decade, and the significant but volatile contribution from net migration, make it
impossible to rely on past demographic trends from steadier times. However none of this
uncertainty provides any short-term basis for reducing current targets for house building in
England, given the very substantial shortfall in dwellings against households (see page 8).
Another key question about the latest round of UK household projections is:1 how far were
household growth rates frustrated and slowed down by difficult housing market and
economic conditions over the last decade? As a corollary, will growth rates resume in the
event of any economic and housing market recovery? – albeit that recovery now looks some
way off given the impact of Brexit uncertainties (see page 4).
There has been a long-term trend towards smaller households and thus larger household
numbers relative to the size of the population. This reflects a number of factors including a
rising proportion of older households, greater prosperity and rising levels of divorce and
separation. However, during the downturn the fall in ‘headship rates’ (the average number
of people in a household) drastically slowed: they are now higher than was anticipated in
earlier rounds of projections. While the consensus is that headship rates will continue to
decline, there is considerable uncertainty about how quickly this will happen. In Wales, for
example, the (latest) 2014 household projections show the headship rate gradually falling
from 2.29 in 2014 to 2.23 in 2024 and 2.19 in 2034.2 In contrast, in the last set of
household projections based on pre-credit-crunch trends, the headship rate was projected 
to fall from 2.20 in 2008, to 2.10 in 2023 and 2.02 by 2033. 
Even if housebuilding rates still need to rise in the short term, the reality is that in the
medium and longer term two important drivers of household growth – migration and
household size – lie uncertainly beneath the shadow of Brexit.
References
1 See Commentary Chapter 2 in the 2017 edition of the UK Housing Review for a further discussion of
household projections across the UK.
2 Welsh Government (2017) Local Authority Household Projections (2014-based). Cardiff: Welsh Government.
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8Successive housing ministers and indeed prime ministers have rooted England’s housingproblems in the failure of housing supply, rightly arguing that governments have
regularly fallen short in building enough homes to keep pace with growing household
numbers. Taking vacants and second homes into account, there is a crude shortage of
around 1.25 million homes. At the simplest level we can all agree that supply is crucial but
the reality is far more complex, as former minister Nick Raynsford argues cogently in
Substance not Spin.1
As we show in the chart, supply is rising but still lags behind overall demand based on
projected household growth. The government and most commentators now use the annual
data on net additions to measure supply, i.e. new completions minus demolitions plus
conversions and changes of use. They appear more reliable than the quarterly housebuilding
statistics, which consistently underestimate output, triggering a DCLG review.2
Even if we can agree on the numbers being achieved, we have to ask ‘what is being supplied
and where?’ Across England the supply/demand imbalance varies greatly. In some areas
output is close to what is needed and the big issue is improving the quality of the existing
stock. Then there is the question of what is being built – it is not only a debate about social
versus private output but also where the new private supply is concentrated. Evidence
suggests it is increasingly focussed on the more affluent end of the market. And some of 
this may be driven in part by the purchasing power of overseas investors and schemes such
as Help to Buy.
We therefore cannot assume more supply is the sole answer to ‘the problem’. Indeed as the
evidence to the Redfern Review from Oxford Economics reminds us, it is unlikely to bring
house prices down except in the very long term and with sustained high output of new
homes relative to household growth.3 Even boosting (UK) housing supply to 310,000
homes per annum in their model only brings a five per cent fall in the baseline forecast of
house prices. Oxford Economics says this has ‘important implications for a policy debate
that has focused heavily on supply as both the cause of the problem of high house prices
and its solution.’ Incomes and the cost and supply of credit are also key factors, and here
the constraints being imposed by mortgage regulation and a range of macro-prudential
controls from the Bank of England and elsewhere come into the equation. 
Then of course there is the question of taxation, one revisited annually in the Review.
Owners still experienced net tax benefits of the order of £32 billion in 2015/16 (see page
16). Stamp duty has been or will be reformed across the UK and to a degree is now much
more progressive. As it stands the absence of capital gains tax on the primary residence,
alongside the absence of any tax on the imputed rental return on an owner-occupied
property, are two obvious areas where policy might shift. The council tax regime is another
example of a regressive tax which remains unreformed despite calls for a proper property
tax. And of course there is an unresolved debate on land-value tax. Recently the
government reduced the rate of capital gains tax (CGT) on all asset sales excluding
residential property, in effect penalising residential investment. In 2015 it also imposed a
new CGT on the sale of UK residential property so it is paid by all non-residents on all
values of property (but only on gains since April that year). What both indicate is a
hardening of the tax agenda, and the market reaction and softening in house prices are in
part a result of the tougher tax regime. 
As political pressure to fix a ‘broken’ housing market increases and as the limits of a
supply-only agenda are exposed, so there may be more appetite to consider tax and subsidy
reform. Clearly it carries huge political risks. With other issues dominating and no overall
majority it seems unlikely that the Whitehall government will go there, although in the
devolved administrations there is more appetite for reform. In the next decade, might we
see the mantra of ‘supply, supply and supply’ replaced by a policy that is both more
comprehensive and more sophisticated, and hence more effective? 
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It’s supply, supply and supply – or is it?
English dwelling supply lags projected household growth
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9Shifting policies and definitions are making it difficult to use the term ‘affordablehousing’ in a way which has a consistent meaning. While there used to be consensus
that any housing at significantly below market price was ‘affordable,’ rising house prices
and rents mean that a yardstick based on them (such as Affordable Rents being no more
than 80 per cent of market levels) may no longer deliver prices that lower-income
households can afford. Nor is there any longer the expectation that the difference will be
covered by housing benefit. Some ‘affordable’ products, such as Starter Homes, are in any
case aimed at somewhat higher income groups.
part of Peabody) are deliberately cross-subsidising AR to keep it close to ‘formula’ or social
rent levels. Indeed, the GLA is now offering grant of £60,000 per unit for ‘London
Affordable Rent’ schemes, which will have rents close to social rent levels. In effect the
GLA’s new programme will force providers to choose between social and intermediate
rents (now called ‘London Living Rents’, at 80 per cent of market levels), with the latter
aimed at somewhat higher income groups. The GLA’s concern with affordability should
produce a more targeted output, especially given the higher grant and its prohibition on
further conversion of existing social lettings to AR. 
However, outside London, there is no such prohibition and the embargo on using grant
for social rent remains. AR tends to be set close to the maximum of 80 per cent of market
levels, but in some regions such as Yorkshire and East Midlands this may not place them at
levels very much higher than social rents.3
There are wider concerns about the affordability even of social rents, whether set by
associations or by local authorities. The Review has shown that these have drifted upwards
for the last decade as a proportion of average earnings. This drift will have been halted by
the four-year cut (of one per cent annually) in social rents imposed by government in
April 2016. But the main beneficiary of these cuts is the government’s welfare bill,4 with
any benefit to working tenants being complicated by other changes taking place in the
welfare system.
In an economic context in which real incomes are stagnant (see page 4), the risks to the
affordability of social housing are considerable. The first is that sub-market supply is
insufficient in the first place. The second is that output from investment programmes and
from ‘planning gain’ continues to shift away from lettings at genuinely affordable rents
(although the policy shift in London is a positive sign here). The third is that social and
AR rents resume their upward trajectory when the current cuts end in 2020/21. And the
fourth is that welfare benefit changes – notably the imposition of local housing allowance
caps on social rent claims from 2019 – further undermine the support available to low-
income tenants to pay their rent. The promised review of rents policy must surely both pay
strong heed to affordability and take proper account of welfare benefit changes, as well as
acknowledging the need for social landlords to have stable income streams to underpin
new investment.
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England’s affordable housing supply: what does ‘affordable’ mean?
This means that the government’s affordable housing supply statistics for England have to
be treated with caution (see chart). The latest totals show that grant-funded new supply is
running at about half the level it was six years ago, and that whereas two-thirds of the total
then was let at social rents, that has now fallen to only four per cent. Three-quarters is now
at Affordable Rents (AR). New starts in 2016/17 (not shown) were more encouraging, at
levels higher than for the last two years.
A fuller picture needs to include homes produced without grant. Pending the availability
of official figures (DCLG live table 1000), the NHF’s useful survey of main housing
associations suggests that total affordable supply delivered by associations (including
shared ownership) in 2016/17 was a higher 32,381, with 4,775 (15 per cent) being for
social rent: the difference is due to most social rent output no longer being grant-aided.1
The total is less than half of the projected 80,000 units needed in England annually at sub-
market prices.2 But it also raises the question of whether the output is itself ‘affordable’? In
London, where the current average for AR new build rents is 56 per cent of market levels,
there is considerable variation. Some housing associations (notably Family Mosaic, now
Affordable housing completions funded by the HCA and GLA
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Trying to predict the future of homeownership and the housing market is now morechallenging than ever. Housing supply continues to lag behind effective demand (see
page 8). House prices have slowed though the picture is complexly varied across the UK.1
London’s price growth is easing, with the outer boroughs now more buoyant than central
London. The South and Midlands could see continued growth but there are still areas
that have not ‘caught up’, notably Northern Ireland. 
Measures of affordability give contrasting views depending upon how they are calculated.
ONS recently showed that 25 per cent of neighbourhoods in England and Wales were
inaccessible to prospective homeowners last year with average incomes lower than the
cost of buying an entry-level property.2 However, based on dual-earner incomes,
affordability has eased to a degree (see page 11) – reflecting falling mortgage rates. Of
course, affordability is no longer a complete measure of access to the market because
borrowers fail stress tests and other checks.3
A significant proportion of first-time buyers (FTBs) rely on Help to Buy equity loans, still
available until 2021. With a five per cent deposit, they effectively allow the borrower to
enter the market with a 75 per cent loan rather than pay a premium for a 95 per cent
one. Though FTB numbers remain below the long-term average, this market has grown –
boosted by Help to Buy and the ‘bank of Mum and Dad’.4 The number of 95 per cent
mortgage packages on offer has recently topped 300, up from just six in June 2009, but
still well behind the 900 in June 2007 (see chart).5 Recent analysis of Bank of England
statistics suggests that there has been a 15 per cent increase in households taking out
loans of 4.5 times income in the last 12 months.
These changes reflect a deeply competitive mortgage market where new and existing
players have to ‘innovate’ to get market share. They may also show that the Financial
Policy Committee’s macro-prudential rule – that the proportion of new mortgages with
LTVs at or above 4.5 must be under 15 per cent of all loans – are impacting on some
lenders, given that they will always impose their own buffer beneath this to ensure
compliance. With tighter affordability tests, the imposition of a three per cent stress test6
and closer scrutiny of incomes and outgoings it is a challenge to secure a high-LTV loan.
As the Legal and General’s 2017 report makes clear,7 the proportion of buyers who expect
to get help from family or friends in the future has been rising, up from a third in 2016
to more than 40 per cent in 2017 with about half (48 per cent) of FTBs expecting to get
some help.
Recently there have been predictions of a major readjustment in house prices. Clearly
there is some downward pressure reflecting uncertainty and the costs of stamp duty and
of moving, with sellers having to adjust prices or hold back from selling. This in turn has
created opportunities for gazumping to return as sellers seek to capture what demand
exists. However the fundamentals would suggest that, despite wage growth lagging
behind prices, any correction will be modest. With new instructions from existing owners
falling, in some areas there will be competition but overall we are seeing transactions
decline. A report on Missing Movers highlights the fact that before the downturn there
were about 1.6 million home sales in the UK, falling to 860,000 in 2009 and recovering
to 1.2 million in 2014, a level that has changed little since.8 This suggests we are ‘short of’
an average of 400,000 transactions and most of these will be by mortgaged-movers. 
This raises a myriad of questions about growing labour market/housing market frictions
and the extent to which the latter is holding back the former. There will be a growing
number of households who are frustrated at the lacklustre housing market and, just as
with Generation Rent, will begin to feel the government is doing little to help.
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Home truths?
Low deposit mortgages for first-time buyers return to pre-deregulation levels
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Just when attention is focussed on the accessibility of the housing market to first-timebuyers (FTBs), there is a dearth of statistics. The ONS’s new mix-adjusted house price
series is much better than its predecessor, but sadly ONS no longer provide a specific series
for FTBs. The Halifax series is only now available commercially. This leaves the Nationwide
mix-adjusted FTB house-price series as the only publically available tool for assessing
changes in affordability at this end of the market, not distorted by changes in the mix of
dwellings purchased over time.
Nationwide shows that while FTB house prices in London are now more than 60 per cent
higher than they were in 2007 before the housing market crash, in other parts of the UK
the recovery has been far more modest. Indeed in the three northern regions of England,
and in Scotland, Wales and Northern Ireland, house prices were still lower in 2016 than
they were in 2007.
Across the UK as a whole, house-price-to-income ratios in 2016 had returned to 2007
levels. However, once account is taken of the fall in interest rates over that period, mortgage
costs as a proportion of incomes can be seen (first chart) to have remained steady at
2003/04 levels, albeit rather higher than earlier in the decade. It should be noted that these
figures are measured against average working-household incomes, as a high proportion of
FTB households have dual incomes. Measures based solely on individual incomes have
their uses but inevitably exaggerate the affordability barriers to homeownership.
The UK figures reflect to a degree the sharp rise in London house prices in recent years. The
second chart shows just how much the London picture differs from the rest of the UK. In
particular it shows that it is only in London that mortgage-cost-to-income ratios have
returned to 2007 levels. In other parts of Great Britain these ratios have fallen back to only
a little above the levels prevailing early in the new millennium. 
The story in Northern Ireland is rather different as the very sharp spike in mortgage-cost-to-
income ratios in 2007 reflected the way house prices there trebled between 2001 and 2007,
and then collapsed far more than in other parts of the UK. Indeed house prices in Northern
Ireland in 2006 were barely 60 per cent of their 2007 levels. In this the Northern Ireland
housing market was clearly more influenced by the similarly volatile market south of its
border, rather than movements elsewhere in the UK. 
In 2017 there are indications that London house prices are beginning to fall, and clearly the
squeeze on real incomes and anxieties about post-Brexit economic prospects are a factor.
Such uncertainty is likely to keep interest rates low for a while yet, but eventually they must
be expected to rise from their current exceptionally low levels. This should act as a further
check on future house-price growth. 
How affordable is the market for first-time buyers?
Housing market affordability in the UK
4.0
3.5
3.0
2.5
2.0
1.5
1.0
0.5
0.0
40
35
30
25
20
15
10
5
0
Ra
tio
s
Pe
rc
en
ta
ge
s
Source: Nationwide FTB house prices; Living Costs and Food Survey Working-Household Incomes.
Mortgage-cost-to-incomes
(right-hand scale)
House-price-to-incomes 
(left-hand scale)
199
4
199
5
199
6
199
7
199
8
199
9
200
0
200
1
200
2
200
3
200
4
200
5
200
6
200
7
200
8
200
9
201
0
201
1
201
2
201
3
201
4
201
5
201
6
199
4
199
5
199
6
199
7
199
8
199
9
200
0
200
1
200
2
200
3
200
4
200
5
200
6
200
7
200
8
200
9
201
0
201
1
201
2
201
3
201
4
201
5
201
6
Regional mortgage-cost-to-income ratios
35.0
30.0
25.0
20.0
15.0
10.0
5.0
0.0
Ra
tio
s
Source: Nationwide FTB house prices; Living Costs and Food Survey Working-Household Incomes.
Note: Shows selected regions and countries, partly for clarity and partly because the Nationwide series does not
provide figures for England or the South East. It provides data for standard statistical regions whereas household
income data used by the UK Housing Review are for government office regions. 
London South West West Midlands Northern Ireland
Yorks & The Humber Wales Scotland
12
The recent sharp rise in levels of court orders for possession against private tenants, anda similar rise in the levels of homelessness resulting from the ending of assured
shorthold tenancies (ASTs) have focused attention on the very limited security of tenure
provided to private tenants.
It should be mentioned that court orders and AST homelessness relate only to a small
proportion of tenancies that end in any year – nearly four-fifths end voluntarily. Just over a
fifth can be said to result from landlord pressure, the most common reason being the
desire to sell the property.1
18,750 households were accepted as homeless in England in 2016 as a result of ASTs
ending, almost one-third of all statutory homelessness cases. This is a remarkable fourfold
increase since 2009, although today’s level is only slightly higher than in 2001. Indeed over
that longer period homelessness due to the ending of ASTs has declined relative to the
overall size of the sector, although a fuller reckoning also needs to take account of local
authorities’ homelessness prevention activities. 
Similarly, PRS court orders rose from just under 27,000 in 2009 to nearly 46,000 in 2015,
before easing back to just over 43,000 in 2016. But again the 2009 level was a bit of a post-
credit-crunch dip and, over the whole period from the millennium, court order numbers
have risen roughly in line with growth in the size of the PRS (see chart). 
The Cambridge Centre for Housing and Planning Research has recently examined
possession claims in the PRS in some detail.2 They show that the growth rate of accelerated
actions through section 21 claims is fastest in London, the East and South East, with
virtually no growth in the rest of England; four out five claims occur in the three 
worst-affected regions. This mirrors the UK Housing Review breakdown of homelessness
trends, which also shows acceptances increasingly sharply in London and slightly less in the
rest of the South, with only small increases in the Midlands and North. This can be related 
to the greater impact in London and the south of welfare policies bearing down on eligible
rents for housing benefit in the PRS, both through the ‘caps’ and the failure to increase 
LHA rates in line with market changes (see page 15).
The ending of tenancies through accelerated procedures is, however, just one expression of
private tenants’ lack of security. It also puts tenants at a negotiating disadvantage, whether 
in respect of rents or requiring landlords to undertake repairs or meet other obligations.
Indeed the Cambridge report cites cases where landlord evictions followed tenants making
complaints about disrepair.
When the current tenancy regime was introduced in 1989 it reflected concerns about
providing terms that could restore investor confidence and grow the sector, following its long
decline (see page 13). Nearly three decades on, with the sector having nearly tripled in size, 
t is reasonable to ask whether that regime is still appropriate. Indeed Scotland has already
decided to change, and from this December all new private tenancies will have extra security
with the abolition of ‘no cause’ evictions. But alongside the usual grounds for possession 
i.e. rent arrears) landlords will still be able to regain possession if they intend to sell. 
Similar provisions form part of the long-standing security of tenure in the PRS in Germany.
This has not been detrimental to investment in the sector, which accounts for half of all
housing provision. More recently (2004) Ireland introduced a four-year period of security 
of tenure, following the initial six months of a tenancy, during which landlords can only
obtain possession if they show good cause. Again a provision allows landlords to obtain
possession if they wish to sell the property. This legal regime is backed by a regulatory regime
(a ‘Residential Tenancies Board’). While there are indications that some landlords 
are leaving the sector, this may relate to tax changes, as overall the sector has grown
significantly since 2006.3
With Scotland taking the lead it is open to the other UK countries to consider reforms 
that would not only improve the experience and quality of the PRS offer for the –
predominantly younger – households in the sector, but also enhance the sector’s reputation.
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Private rented sector insecurity – how big a factor in homelessness?
Sharp rise in PRS court orders in England post 2009
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The recovery of the private rented sector in the UK is a notable feature of 21st centuryhousing history. Far from being consigned to the dustbin, the sector has undergone a
revival and stock numbers now exceed those of social housing. Its long decline through
the twentieth century bottomed out in 1986 at 1,911,000 homes. Over the next 18 years it
grew and in 2005 passed the three million mark (3,122,000). It then took only four years
(2009) to reach four million and another four before exceeding five million in 2013. An
indication of the impact is that the proportion of 25 to 34-year-olds renting from a
private landlord increased from 24 to 46 per cent in the past decade.1 The question now
is whether growth in the sector has peaked, given the ever more negative fiscal and
regulatory environment it is now operating in? 
higher-rate taxpayers. Tax liability was previously assessed on profits after these reliefs, but
is now assessed before such reliefs are applied to turnover, pushing some basic-rate
taxpayers into the higher banding and potentially losing them some entitlement to
means-tested benefits.
We have also seen the introduction of higher rates of stamp duty on property purchases by
landlords. Since April 2016, anyone buying a second home has to pay three per cent on
top of the normal rate of stamp duty applying to the property, while property investors
were excluded from the 20 per cent cut in capital gains tax applied to all other investors. 
In 2016, the Prudential Regulation Authority set out a policy statement and supervisory
statement (SS13/16) on Underwriting standards for buy-to-let mortgage contracts. Later in the
year, HM Treasury announced that it was granting the Bank of England’s Financial Policy
Committee (FPC) powers of direction in the buy to let market, allowing the FPC from
2017 to direct the PRA and the Financial Conduct Authority to require regulated lenders
to place limits on buy to let mortgage lending in relation to their loan-to-value and
interest-coverage ratios.
The landscape for individual and so-called ‘amateur’ landlords has changed radically
though the government is hoping that by excluding registered companies from some of
the tax changes they have provided an alternative. However, in converting to a limited
company an individual will trigger a CGT liability as well as having to meet legal and
transaction costs. At the same time the government hopes to have reduced the damage to
the institutional investor market which mainly supplies new build homes.
Not surprisingly there has been some turbulence in the buy to let market and its growth
has slowed since April 2016, with more corporate investors emerging. Landlords have
widened their search for yield and capital appreciation. Countrywide estimates that the
changes have reduced the competition between landlords and first-time buyers, at least in
some markets.3 Landlords are now buying fewer homes and more selectively, and some
are disposing of property – typically those with low returns. 
Looking at the party manifestos in the run up to the general election there was a wide
appetite to further regulate the private rented sector. Given the new found significance of
the Generation Rent vote it is hard to see how this agenda can fail to roll forward, as it has
already in Scotland and Wales. These are indeed taxing times for landlords. 
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Private renting – taxing times for landlords
The chart gives a sense of the history of the PRS and the impact of factors that shrank the
market – such as the rise of homeownership, advent of slum clearance and imposition of
rent controls – and its subsequent recovery aided by government policy, housing benefit2
and most recently by access to interest-only mortgages. However over the last two years
we have seen a largely unanticipated onslaught of tax and other changes bearing down
negatively on both the PRS and buy to let, in an attempt to address a perceived
imbalance with homeownership. This seems set to continue. 
In the 2015 Summer Budget the chancellor announced major changes to the tax
treatment of investment properties. From April 2017, higher-rate tax relief on landlords’
mortgage payments was phased out and limited to the basic rate of income tax. In
addition, landlords can no longer claim a ten per cent wear-and-tear allowance but for
fully furnished properties have to submit actual costs. The tax changes do not only affect
Private rented housing in England and Wales 
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Statutory homelessness acceptances have been growing in England since 2010, albeit thatthe rate of increase has significantly slowed. Homelessness acceptances had also been
rising in Northern Ireland, but fell in 2016. As a result of policy changes, there have been
recent falls in formal homelessness acceptances in Scotland and Wales, though that pattern
has now stabilised in Scotland and may have started to reverse in Wales (see chart). 
Levels of rough sleeping appear to be rising in Wales,6 as well as in Scotland. In Glasgow
a Rough Sleeping Taskforce has been established and there have been hints of action in
the Scottish Government’s next Programme for Government. 
In Northern Ireland, statutory homelessness is relatively high because the homelessness
‘route’ is regularly used to rehouse older people no longer able to maintain a family
home. Statutory homelessness figures in the first quarter of 2017 were significantly higher
than in the same quarter in 2016, though this may turn out to be a statistical anomaly as
overall trends continue downward. Northern Ireland has had a rolling sequence of
national homelessness strategies in place since 2002, with the latest published in April
2017. The previous strategy was said to be ‘widely perceived as moving homelessness
policy in the right directions... [but] Gaps remained in service provision and progress in
delivering the Strategy had not always been rapid, including the development of
preventative services.’ 7
New statistical modelling for Crisis by Glen Bramley predicts that levels of ‘core’
homelessness will continue to rise in the medium term in Great Britain, with the
possibility of a slight levelling-off in the short term due to housing market corrections
and a favourable labour market.8 In the longer term it is likely that numbers will increase
further, particularly in London, with greater use of unsuitable temporary accommodation
as well as rough sleeping and sofa-surfing. Drivers include the availability of affordable
accommodation, the extent to which prevention measures are used, and the
demographics of people experiencing homelessness. But the most important driver of
homelessness in all its forms is poverty.9
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Homelessness – can prevention work have a lasting impact?
The big policy story on homelessness in England is the passing of the Homelessness
Reduction Act 2017, based on recommendations from an independent panel convened by
Crisis.1 The panel focused on the distinction between ‘priority’ and ‘non-priority’ groups,
which results in most single homeless people only receiving advice and assistance.
Research has consistently demonstrated that this support is often very poor.2 While in
Scotland the priority need criterion has now been abolished, so that virtually all
homeless people are entitled to rehousing, this was judged unviable in England’s more
pressured housing market.3
The panel instead recommended the approach encapsulated in the Housing (Wales) Act
(2014): more robust homelessness prevention and relief duties owed to all eligible
households, regardless of priority need status.4 Its key proposals were incorporated into a
private members bill, and gained the government’s backing together with £61 million
towards its implementation, which is likely to begin in 2018.
An interim evaluation of the 2014 homelessness legislation in Wales found stakeholders
‘overwhelmingly positive’ about its impact,5 and the 2016/17 official statistics indicated
high levels of success with both prevention (62 per cent) and relief (41 per cent)
interventions. The number of priority-need households assisted under the full duty is
correspondingly much lower now in Wales than statutory homeless ‘acceptance’ levels
under the pre-2015 system, although it has risen somewhat in the most recent year. 
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The welfare reforms made by the coalition and Conservative governments continue toroll out across Great Britain, presenting ever greater challenges both to claimants and
to the social landlords trying to assist low-income households. The most immediate new
challenge is the sharp cut in the maximum benefit cap, applied to out-of-work households
below pension age, but other tests are also in train. 
Introduced in November 2016, the benefit cap has already seen more than a trebling in
the numbers whose benefit is restricted (now totalling over 68,000 households – see
chart). The greatest numbers affected are in London, reflecting the higher housing costs in
the capital. But proportionately the increases have been greater in other parts of the
country, as the lower caps impact to a much greater extent on larger households, even in
areas with relatively low housing costs. The cap is now also affecting smaller families, with
almost half of all cases involving lone parents with a child no more than three years old.
current UC figures. A clearer picture will emerge as the September UC statistics will include,
for the first time, a tenure breakdown. 
A survey undertaken for Crisis clearly indicates the difficulties being experienced by low-
income households in accessing the PRS, which continue to deepen.3 This evidence is
underlined by the sharp increase in numbers of homeless acceptances that result from the
ending of a PRS assured shorthold tenancy, along with the decline in the extent to which
homeless prevention action enables households to retain their tenancies (see page 12).
Looking ahead, there are also major concerns about the proposal to extend the LHA limits
to social sector tenants from April 2019. This policy is to be phased in, but will apply to all
UC cases, and also to housing benefit cases where tenancies commenced – or have been
renewed – after March 2016. There has been considerable debate about the provisions to
exempt supported housing from this regime, but its impact goes far wider than this,
especially in those areas (the north of England and parts of Scotland and Wales) where
social sector rents are not far below market levels. 
In England it has been found that only in a small number of areas is there any overlap
between council rents and LHA rates, but with housing association rents there are overlaps
in almost two-fifths of local authority areas. Within those figures, more detailed analysis
indicates that by far the biggest effects will be on single people aged under 35, soon eligible
only for the lower SAR rather than the much higher one-bedroom LHA rate.4
Across Great Britain as a whole it is estimated that the SAR-based caps will impact on close
to 50,000 young single people in the social sector. This will put pressure on social landlords
to consider the retrograde step of providing shared accommodation for young single people,
however inappropriate, and which is often problematic in terms of the more intensive
management such tenancies require, with their faster turnover and hence higher costs. 
These new challenges come, of course, on top of those resulting from other, ongoing welfare
reforms that already affect low-income tenants and social landlords. These wider reforms are
considered in more detail in the UK Housing Review 2017 and will continue to be assessed in
future editions.
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The unfolding welfare reform challenges
While less dramatic, other welfare cuts continue to deepen, with the freeze (until 2020) on
local housing allowance (LHA) rates for private tenants already seeing LHA fall further
below average market levels. A recent analysis by Savills found that in some two-fifths to a
half of all areas, LHA rates are now more than ten per cent lower than the ‘30th percentile’
rates at which they were set in 2011.1
Previous analyses of DWP statistics clearly showed the impact of the LHA limits in
reducing the numbers of housing benefit claimants able to secure tenancies in inner
London, and in particular the impact on young single people (aged under 35) subject to
the much lower shared accommodation rate (SAR).2 However it is difficult to assess those
impacts as more and more claimants are moved on to universal credit (UC). As a result
they no longer feature in the housing benefit statistics, nor can they be identified in the
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Housing tax provisions are complex. Not only do they vary between and withintenures, but they also impact very differently on younger and older households.
Recognition that Britain’s acute housing market problems cannot be dealt with simply by
increasing supply (see page 8) has focused attention on the tax issues that inflate and
distort housing demand: this raises some prospect of reform. If it were to happen, a key
dimension would be to look at the way taxes affect different age groups. 
The two primary tax reliefs for homeowners are the absence of capital gains tax (CGT) on
the primary residence, and the absence of any tax on the ‘use value’ of owners living in
the home they own. The latter (originally known as Schedule A tax) was abolished in the
UK over 50 years ago. Logically, mortgage interest tax relief (MITR) existed to provide an
offset to Schedule A tax, but it lingered on for homeowners for a further 35 years. While
historically the valuations on which Schedule A tax was levied had been allowed to fall
well below market values, at full value it would raise significant sums – even after any
offsetting tax relief. 
inflated house prices, further benefitting established owners but increasing the ‘entry
price’ for new first-time buyers.
CGT relief helps those who have been owners for a long period, and in particular those
whose ownership dates from before the sharp rise in house prices over the decade to
2007. It is also of greater benefit to those who bought more expensive homes. 
The absence of a use-value tax also benefits established owners, either those who have
paid off their mortgage or have seen it shrink to a small proportion of their home’s
current value. In their case they would be liable to the tax without any, or any significant,
MITR offset. In contrast first-time buyers would rarely pay any use-value tax if it existed,
as in their case MITR would likely offset their gross tax liability in full. 
There are, of course, some taxes that relate to property values. Inheritance tax does
capture some of the housing wealth accumulated by homeowners over a lifetime – but
only to a very modest degree. In 2015/16 the value of inheritance tax based on housing
wealth was just £1.7 billion. Stamp duty also reflects property values – and is more
significant in that it raised £7.5 billion in 2015/16 – but this is still significantly below
the amount that would be raised by CGT. It also has the disadvantage that it is not an
incentive to mobility because it is levied every time someone moves, and is more of a
burden to frequent movers. This anomaly would be removed by CGT.
The other tax that is, at least in part, related to property values is council tax. However the
limited council tax property value bands, and the differentials in the tax rates applied
within each band, both serve to make the tax a regressive one and have more impact on
those in lower-value dwellings. Nor is it based on ownership – it applies equally to
private and social sector tenants, as well as to homeowners. Moreover, the way that
central government’s financial support to local government is structured also softens the
impact of the council tax in higher-value areas. For all these reasons council tax should be
seen as something of a flawed hybrid, rather than as a property tax as such.
Property taxes are, of course, highly sensitive. Longstanding and authoritative critiques of
the existing arrangements have so far borne little fruit. At best the recent flurry of stamp
duty reforms have made the tax a little more progressive and have removed the anomalies
created by its old ‘slab’ structure, but its differential impact on frequent movers still exists.
However gradual, a move towards CGT and use-value taxes, with reduced reliance on
stamp duty and council tax, would be a step towards a property tax regime more
coherently related to property values. It would also be a step towards a tax system more
balanced in its impact on younger compared with older households. 
Housing, taxation and the generations
The sums involved are considerable. Taken together and even after making provision
for ‘rollover relief’ for CGT, and for MITR against a use-value tax, these two homeowner
tax reliefs were together worth more than £35 billion in 2015/16 (see chart). Both
benefit established homeowners rather than recent or would-be first-time buyers.
Moreover such is the extent of the tax benefits they are to some degree reflected in
Value of homeowner tax reliefs
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As the Review has consistently pointed out, Scotland’s housing policy is now clearlydiverging from that of the UK government. For example, the right to buy in Scotland
has ended with remarkably little fuss, and an affordable housebuilding target for the new
parliament is now in place. Reforms in the private rented sector are in hand, including
ambitious energy-efficiency standards, and are discussed here.
House prices in Scotland returned to their 2007 peak in April 2017, and moved above it
in May.1 The annual increase was 3.5 per cent to May 2017, compared to 4.7 per cent for
the UK as a whole. Nonetheless, the housing market generally has shown signs of
weakening. Sales fell by 17 per cent in the year to March 2017, although this decrease was
the smallest among the UK’s four nations. Private construction has slowed: starts fell by
five per cent in 2016.2 Across the country as a whole, completions are above projected
household growth to 2037, but there were deficits in Glasgow, Edinburgh and Aberdeen.3
The Scottish Government is committed to delivering 50,000 units of affordable housing
over the 2016-21 parliament. Within this, 35,000 homes will be social rented. There was a
marked upswing in social sector starts in 2016/17, to 6,332, the highest recorded in the
post-devolution era.4 Overall there were 9,308 affordable starts in 2016/17 which is close
to the overall affordable target, albeit that the balance needs to shift towards social
renting.5 In June, local authorities were given funding allocations for the next three years,
in part to improve their ability to deliver the affordable homes target.6
Tenants will also be able to refer proposed rent increases to a rent officer, and the act also
makes provision for ‘rent pressure zones’ where rents are rising too quickly, are causing
tenants difficulties or are increasing pressure on the local authority to provide more
housing or to subsidise housing costs. Edinburgh has already started to make the case for
one. If ministers agree to such zones, rent increases on existing tenancies will be capped
for a maximum of five years, with the cap set at no lower than CPI +1 per cent.
Meanwhile, a Scottish Government consultation on minimum energy-efficiency standards
in the PRS took place between April and June. New tenancies would be required to meet
EPC band E from April 2019, and all PRS lettings would have to meet it by 2022.7 It
envisages the standard being raised to EPC band D for new tenancies from 2022 and for
all private tenancies by 2025. It is estimated that some 30,000 dwellings will be affected
by the initial requirement and a further 95,000 to reach the higher standard.8 Sub-
standard properties are associated with lack of a mains gas boiler and older detached
dwellings with stone walls, both of which are prevalent in rural areas. The consultation
also sought views on a possible upper limit on the cost of improvements, as well as lower
energy standards being required in properties where they are technically or legally
difficult to achieve (e.g. listed buildings). 
Finally, the Scottish Government’s Rent Income Guarantee Scheme is still being
developed in an effort to support the build to rent sector, which has been slower to take
off than in England. The government believes that it will help to support the
development of some 2,500 properties and generate £500 million of investment. The
government’s maximum exposure is ten per cent of rental income, and this forms the
basis of the contingent liability of £15 million.9
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Scotland leads on private rented sector reform
The Private Housing (Tenancies) (Scotland) Act 2016 marks the most significant reform
of private renting in more than a quarter of a century and is expected to come into force
in December 2017. New PRS tenancies will be open-ended and significantly more secure
through the virtual ending of ‘no fault’ evictions (see page 12). 
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Differences between the UK government’s housing policies and those emerging in Walescontinue to grow. Two substantial pieces of housing legislation were passed during the
fourth term of the Welsh Government: the Housing (Wales) Act 2014 and the Renting
Homes (Wales) Act 2016, which have significantly changed the housing landscape. 
The first year of a new government term has seen legislation heralding the abolition of
both the right to buy and the right to acquire.1 Five authorities, including Cardiff, have
already taken advantage of powers in the Housing (Wales) Measure 2011 to apply to
suspend the right to buy in their areas in order to ‘protect social housing assets’. However,
as the chart shows, without extra incentives such as those added to right to buy in England
in 2012, sales are already running at very low levels.
The new government is also developing a land transaction tax to replace stamp duty (rates
and bands will be set in autumn 2017).2 There is also now a commitment to reform the
regulatory controls over housing associations in Wales following the ONS decision to
reclassify them as public bodies for accounting purposes. 
Social rents have continued to rise, rather than being cut by one per cent annually as in
England. A review of rent policy is ongoing, part of the context for which is the coming
application of LHA rates to the social housing sector. This will have major implications, in
particular for some housing associations operating in the South Wales Valleys, notably
those set up through stock transfers. Welsh local authorities have in the meantime taken a
pragmatic approach to increasing their rents,3 seeing the opportunity to invest in new
council housing as well as in existing stock (for the eleven councils that still own housing).
For example, Flintshire Council has plans to build 500 new homes by 2021, 300 for
Affordable Rent and 200 for social rent. 
Affordable housing delivery is very much in the spotlight, with a target of 20,000 for the
period 2016-21. Although this includes Help to Buy (to support the purchase of 6,000
homes), it still represents a significant increase on the previous target of 10,000. Housing
supply pacts have been signed by the Welsh Government, first with Community Housing
Cymru and the Welsh LGA and, more recently, with the Home Builders Federation and the
Federation of Master Builders. The pacts make commitments aimed at increasing supply.
The Welsh Government has continued its normal practice of adding to the Social Housing
Grant budget during the year. During 2016/17, £30 million was added, taking the total to
about £100 million. In addition, £20 million from reserves has been targeted specifically
at innovative models of housing that can be built quickly and reduce or eliminate fuel
bills, with an expected 1,000 affordable homes to be supported via this mechanism. 
A steering group has overseen the development of criteria and a bidding process, and there
are indications that, dependent on delivery, a bigger scheme could be forthcoming. 
The government’s affordable housing programme also includes co-operative housing of
various tenures and a Rent to Own model. The latter provides tenants with the option to
buy via shared ownership. The aim is to provide at least 1,000 homes on this basis during
the current government’s term of office. 
How likely is it that the 20,000 affordable supply target will be achieved? Looking first at
Help to Buy, given that more than 2,000 homes have already been bought using a
government shared equity loan since May 2016, a target of 6,000 purchases by 2021 seems
if anything rather cautious. 
Turning to affordable housing delivery, statistics for 2016/17 are not yet available but in
2015/16 local authorities reported 2,400 additional affordable homes across Wales, with
94 per cent of these delivered by housing associations. Providing 14,000 additional
affordable homes over five years therefore looks quite challenging, even if everything in
the economy goes smoothly. In this context, an August 2017 briefing paper from
Community Housing Cymru, the Home Builders Federation and Federation of Master
Builders4 makes a series of recommendations on public land disposal and various aspects
of planning, all aimed at securing the 20,000 target. 
What is positive, and another contrast to the position in England, is a significant degree of
consensus about the importance of affordable and social housing and a considerable
amount of joint working being invested in its delivery. 
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Wales develops distinctive housing policies
Decline in right to buy in Wales
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Unlike Scotland and Wales, Northern Ireland shares with England an uncertainpolitical environment which is hampering both decision-making and progress in
tackling housing and welfare issues. After elections in March, the Northern Ireland
Assembly was suspended for the fourth time in 19 years, as a result of a misfired
renewable heat incentive scheme. Agreement on restarting the assembly is now
complicated by the deal made by the Democratic Unionist Party to sustain the minority
Westminster government, but also by disagreement between the parties on equality issues
such as the Irish language and same-sex marriage.
In the meantime, there is no minister responsible for housing nor is there a budget for
the current financial year. Normal operations continue but without the assembly there
will be little progress on pressing issues such as the Northern Ireland Housing Executive’s
future, and its need to bring its homes up to the Decent Homes Standard.
Rent levels present a major challenge when it comes to reinvestment in the Housing
Executive’s stock. Its rents are much lower than those of housing associations, and around
£20 per week less than the average rent for similar local authority housing in England.
Rent freezes (following the examples from England) have not helped. There has also been
a lack of political agreement on a new governance model that could permit the Housing
Executive to borrow, stalling any reforms. Despite this, NIHE is exploring the possibility
of building new homes in its estates, to help deal with unfitness in the stock and increase
the number of new units. Any proposals will however need approval from the
Department for Communities (DfC).
Another important issue is the potential impact of Westminster’s welfare reforms. The
bedroom tax and benefits cap will continue to be almost fully mitigated in Northern
Ireland until March 2020, with a review scheduled in 2018/19. However stakeholders are
calling for this mitigation to be extended to the UK government’s plan to apply local
housing allowance rates to social sector rents from 2019 (see page 15). A recent report by
CIH Northern Ireland showed that the change will make new social housing less viable in
certain areas. The problem is that any mitigation will inevitably affect Northern Ireland’s
block grant.
In the meantime Northern Ireland persists in having a housing market distinct from the
rest of the UK, not least in the slowness of its recovery from the credit crunch. Such was
the plunge from their (unrealistically high) pre-2007 levels that house prices are now
barely 60 per cent of what they were, and are forecast by PwC to grow more slowly than
the rest of the UK over the next five years (see page 11). Market sales fell by 25 per cent in
the first quarter of 2017, although this may have been an anomaly and there was an
encouraging rise in private-sector new build starts compared to the first quarter of 2016.
Nevertheless any recovery is fragile given that the Northern Ireland market seems
particularly vulnerable to the uncertainty of the current political stalemate and the UK’s
decision to leave the EU.
DfC originally set targets for social housing starts of 1,600 in 2016/17, 2,000 in 2017/18
and 2,200 in 2018/19. The 2016/17 target was achieved, with 1,604 starts, although this
depended to a considerable extent on acquisitions and refurbishment, which accounted
for 36 per cent of the total. Completions in 2016/17 were 1,387 units, of which 955 were
new build. 
However this year’s target has now been cut to 1,750 as the DfC’s capital budget is only
two-thirds of its original bid. After pre-existing commitments were met, the remainder
was directed to housing but this still only provides £106 million for the Social Housing
Development Programme – the same as 2016/17. In order to raise output, DfC is giving
lower priority to advanced land purchases, possibly risking future years’ targets. It is
unlikely that housing associations will achieve more than 1,750 starts in any case, due to
late confirmation of the programme and the deferral of revisions to total cost indicators
and housing association grant.
Given the growing evidence of housing need and the fragile private market it is perhaps
surprising that social housing investment has not featured more strongly in Northern
Ireland’s budget. When the DUP negotiated its £1.5 billion ‘confidence and supply’ deal
with the Westminster government, housing did not feature. Strains on housing-related
budgets have been apparent from recent cuts in supported housing services in the
voluntary sector, combined with continued uncertainty about dealing with welfare
reforms. Additional social housing supply is urgently needed, but is there the budgetary
capacity – or the development capacity within the still-small housing association sector –
to provide the increased supply that Northern Ireland now requires? 
Northern Ireland’s political uncertainty
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Updates to the 2017 Compendium of Tables
Alongside, and contributing to, the preparation of the Briefing Paper, 26 tables from the Compendium of Tables in the main Review have been updated. They are listed below. 
The new tables can be seen and downloaded at the Review’s website, www.ukhousingreview.org.uk
The UK Housing Review is the key source of information for those involved in housing. 
Celebrating 25 years of publishing comprehensive housing statistics covering England (and its regions), Wales, Scotland and Northern Ireland, 
the latest Review looks at the implications of Brexit, housing in the European Union and the further effects of welfare reform. It also has Steve
Wilcox's reflections on key issues from 25 editions of the Review.
The Review does of course include its regular chapters of analysis of UK housing issues as well as more than 120 tables of comprehensive
housing data.
Price: £25 plus postage. 
Order online: www.cih.org/thebookshop 
For further information: phone 024 7685 1752 or email bookshop@cih.org
The UK Housing Review published each year provides a key resource for managers and
policy-makers across the public and private housing sectors. It is now in its 25th year.
The UK Housing Review 2017 Briefing Paper updates key issues and data from this year’s
full Review, focusing on these themes:
• The economy, public spending and the post-election environment
• Household growth and housing supply
• House prices, mortgages and affordability
• Affordable housing supply in England
• The private rented sector
• Homelessness
• Welfare reform
The Briefing Paper also takes a closer look at housing in Scotland, Wales and Northern
Ireland.
The UK Housing Review 2017 Briefing Paper is available to download at www.cih.org 
Tables from the full Review and recent updates to them
are available on the UKHR website:
www.ukhousingreview.org.uk
See inside the back cover for details of how to obtain your
copy of the full UK Housing Review 2017. Next year’s
edition is planned for March 2018.
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